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Access Control is an important mechanism of information security. Role-Based Access 
Control is a famous access control approach with good flexibility. RBAC96 and ARBAC97 
are classical RBAC models. The ARBAC97 model facilitates decentralized administration of 
RBAC. However, ARBAC97 has some shortcomings in the case of being used in an 
organization with autonomous subsidiaries. The member of an administrative role can 
operate directly in the role range of a junior administrative role, which violates the autonomy 
of subsidiaries. We propose a new model named N-RBAC to overcome this weakness. In N-
RBAC, roles are arranged according to a hierarchical namespace structure. Thus the role 
hierarchy is constructed in a local space instead of in a global space. The N-RBAC model 





Access control is a key mechanism to protect data from unauthorized access. Discretionary 
Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory Access Control (MAC) had been used for more than 
twenty years before the appearance of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). With the 
development of computer science since 1980’s, many new requirements of access control 
were brought forward, which couldn’t be fulfilled under the framework of DAC or MAC. 
More extensibility and flexibility are needed than DAC and MAC can provide.  
RBAC was proposed under this background. Essentially, RBAC is a mandatory access 
control model because it forbids delegating permissions to other users. However, the 
direction of information flow was not limited in RBAC. An intermediate element, the role, 
was introduced as a media to deliver the authorization information.  
The original formal definition of RBAC was from (Ferraiolo et al. 1992). Ravi Sandhu and 
his Laboratory of Information Security Technique (LIST) of George Mason University 
proposed the famous RBAC96 model (Sandhu et al. 1996) in 1996. They divided traditional 
RBAC model into four conceptual models, and provided their formal definitions. Further in 
1997, they proposed an administrative RBAC model named ARBAC97 to guide the 
decentralized role administration (Sandhu et al.. 1999). RBAC96 and ARBAC97 represented 
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the essence of role based access control well. They are both classical RBAC models. Most 
subsequent researches of RBAC were based on the two models.  
2. Autonomy Problems In RBAC 
The ARBAC97 model is more suitable to be applied in decentralized RBAC administration 
than previous models. However, it has some shortcomings if be used in an organization that 
composed of one or more autonomic branches.  
For the convenience of description, let’s consider a newspaper office named VERYNEWS. 
VERYNEWS comprises three channels: Society Channel, Entertainment Channel and 
Military Channel. Each channel is an autonomic branch of VERYNEWS and maintained by 
an independent editor team.  
Now we apply RBAC96 and ARBAC97 to build the RBAC system of VERYNEWS. The 
regular role hierarchy of VERYNEWS is shown in Figure 1, and the administrative role 

























Figure 2 The administrative role hierarchy of VERYNEWS 
 
Part of the can_assign relations of URA97 is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 part of the can_assign relations of URA97 
Administrative Role Prerequisite Condition Role Range 
SoSO  ED  ],[ SESE  
SoSO  SWESE ∧  ],[ SAESAE  
CSO  MEED ∧  ],[ SESE  
CSO  ED  ),( DIRED  
SSO  EP  ],[ EDED  
SSO  ED  ],( DIRED  
 
Through an analyzing to Figure 1, Figure 2 and Table 1, following shortcomings of above 
model are addressed. 
SC1. Over-administration 
A senior administrative role inherits all permissions from its junior administrative roles in 
Figure 2. This implies that a member of the senior administrative role can operate directly 
within its junior administrative roles’ role ranges. For example, a member of CSO can 
assign John to the role ‘SAE’ only if he has been a member of ‘ED’. Given the relation 
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condition SWESE ∧  and thus bypasses SoSO. This is an intervention to the role 
administration of the autonomic branch ‘Society Channel’, and violates the autonomy of 
it. 
SC2. The complexity of role naming 
There may be a great many of roles existing in the RBAC system of a large organization. 
Obviously the name of each role has to be unique. In Figure 1, ‘Society Article Editor 
(SAE)’ and ‘Military Article Editor (MAE)’ are all article editor roles, but they have to 
be prefixed by ‘Society’ and ‘Military’ to keep the uniqueness of their names. If a role 
junior to ‘SAE’ is to be added, we have to name it by a longer name such as ‘Society 
XXX Article Editor’. More complex the role hierarchy is, more long names we have to 
use.  
SC1 is originated from the domination relationship of the administrative roles. The 
permissions of an administrative role can be inherited by a senior administrative role, 
which enables the senior one to do anything that the junior one can do.  
SC2 is originated from that all the roles in RBAC96 and ARBAC97 are defined in a 
global namespace. We have to use different names to ensure the uniqueness.  
We propose a new model to overcome the both shortcomings. We extend the concept of 
organization structure introduced in (Sejong et al. 2002) to a hierarchical namespace 
structure. The roles are not defined in a single global namespace any longer but in many 
different namespaces respectively. Roles defined in a namespace cannot see any roles out 
of the namespace. We call it the Namespace-Based RBAC (N-RBAC) model.  
3. The N-RBAC Model 
3.1 Namespace 
Namespace is a popular term in cyber science. It can be defined as follows (SUNY O 
1993).  
Definition 1 A namespace is an autonomic scoping construct to subdivide the set of 
names and their visibility within a system.  
A namespace may have several sub namespaces. All the namespaces compose of a tree-
like namespace hierarchy.  
The word ‘names’ in definition 1 refers to all the symbols defined in current system. In a 
RBAC system it includes user name, role name, permission name or the names of other 
resources. A name defined inside a namespace must be unique. Two names in two 
different namespaces can use the same symbol because their visibility is restrained by 
their namespaces. For example, the name ‘Article Editor (AE)’ can be defined in both 
namespace A and namespace B. Within any namespace ‘AE’ is a unique symbol. They 
can be referred as A.AE or B.AE out of their own namespace to ensure the global 
uniqueness. Actually this is a kind of segmented naming style and has no essential 
difference with the long naming style described in SC2. However, under the assumption 
that most of the operations are inside a certain namespace in a N-RBAC system, we 
believe the introduction of the namespace hierarchy will remarkably alleviate the naming 
trouble described in SC2.  
The visibility of a name is restrained by its namespace. There will be no dominance 
relation between any roles in different namespaces, even if these namespaces are directly 
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senior and junior ones. We can regard the term namespace as an abstract notation of the 
autonomic branch described in section 2.  
3.2 Resources and Operations 
In access control, the meaning of permission is allowing a user to operate on a certain 
object. We divide the permission set P into two sets: the resource set RS and the 
operation set O. The relation of P, RS and O is defined as follows. 
ORSP ×⊆  
RS denotes all the resources that need to be protected by the RBAC system. In N-RBAC 
these resources are subdivided into different namespaces. 
O denotes the operations that are worked on a certain resource, such as creation, deletion 
and modification. 
The user, role and namespace are also resources in N-RBAC. The convenience of 
treating them as resources is that we can use a single role set R to represent all 
administrative or regular roles. 
Definition 2 is the formal description of the N-RBAC0 model. It is derived from the 
RBAC0 model (Sandhu et al. 1996, pp. 8). 
Definition 2. The N-RBAC0 model has the following components:  
1) U, R, RS, O, S and N (users, roles, resources, operations, sessions and namespaces),   
2) RUNUA ××⊆ , a many-to-many user to role assignment relation, 
RnUUAnNn ..,. ×⊆∈∀  
3) RORSNPA ×××⊆ , a many-to-many permission to role assignment relation, 
RnORSnPAnNn ...,. ××⊆∈∀  
4) USuser →: , a function mapping each session s to the single user user(s) (constant 
for the session's lifetime), and 
5) RSrole 2: → , a function mapping each session s to a set of roles 
})),((|{)( UArsuserrsroles ∈⊆ (which can change with time) and session s has the 
permissions }),,(|),{()( PArorsorssrolesr ∈∪ ∈  
The main difference between RBAC0 and N-RBAC0 is the introduction of namespaces. 
The roles and other resources are subdivided into the namespace hierarchy. Note that the 
user set U is defined globally. The reason to treat user as a global resource is that in most 
organizations the human resource is managed wholly, even if they are composed of many 
autonomic branches.  
The N-RBAC1 model can be defined similarly, and the N-RBAC2 model is unchanged 
from RBAC2. Both N-RBAC1 and N-RBAC2 will not be discussed in this paper. 
3.3 The Administrative Roles 
As described in 1.3, the administrative roles are those roles that have the permissions to 
create, delete a regular role or modify the dominance relation of regular roles. In N-
RBAC, the administrative roles have the permissions to operate on user, role or 
namespace. The user, role and namespace are also resources as described in 3.2. Thus we 
can represent all roles by a single role set R. The namespace resource of a namespace 
refers to the sub-namespaces of it.  
Still we can create an administrative role hierarchy within a namespace. However, the 
introduction of the administrative role hierarchy in ARBAC97 is to facilitate 
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decentralized administration of roles. In N-RBAC, we use the namespace hierarchy to 
deal with decentralized administration of roles. So we discard the administrative role 
hierarchy and define only one administrative role for each namespace.  
We define following constrains on the administrative role:  
Constraint 1: There is only one administrative role in a namespace. 
Constraint 2: the resources user, role and namespace can only be accessed by the 
administrative role.  
 
The two constraints imply there is only one administrative role that can create or delete 
roles or modify the dominance relation of roles in a namespace. The operations of 
creating, deleting or modifying users can only be done by the administrative role of the 
root namespace.  
Administrative roles in different namespaces have no dominance relation. The 
administrative role of a namespace cannot modify the URA, PRA and RRA relation of 
junior namespaces. Those operations can only be done by their own administrative roles. 
By this SC1 is overcome. 
3.4 Origin of A Namespace 
As a kind of resource, a namespace is created by the administrative role of its senior 
namespace. The administrative role is a concomitant of the namespace. That means, as 
soon as the namespace is created, the administrative role is produced as well. The 
administrative role cannot be deleted or modified during the lifecycle of the namespace to 
which it belongs. Thus we define another constraint as follows. 
Constraint 3 The administrative role can only access the resources user, role and 
namespace.  
This constraint implies that the administrative role cannot access those resources out of 
user, role and namespace. The duty of an administrator is to manage the N-RBAC system. 
He has no permission to access other resources such as the business policy, the system 
parameters, and so on. Those resources will be maintained by some regular roles within 
the namespace. 
3.5 URA, PRA and RRA In N-RBAC 
As described above, a fix-authorized administrative role is employed instead of an 
administrative role hierarchy to administrate the RBAC system. This change largely 
simplifies the URA, PRA and RRA relations.  
For a can_assign relation expressed as ]),[,,(_ cayxassigncan , the administrative role x 
is unique in a namespace; and the role range of it is the whole regular role hierarchy of 
the namespace. The prerequisite condition y is not needed any more, because a member 
of the administrative role can directly assign a user to any roles in the namespace. In fact 
the can_assign relation has disappeared in N-RBAC. In a well-constructed namespace 
hierarchy, the organization structure within a namespace is often compact and centralized. 
So The URA model is not needed, as well as the PRA model. 
The can_modify relation is simplified due to the disappearance of the administrative role 
hierarchy. However, any constraints defined in RRA model are still required to maintain 
global consistency of authorization.  
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4. A Sample of N-RBAC 
We implemented the N-RBAC system of VERYNEWS as an illustration to N-RBAC. 
Figure 3 shows the namespace hierarchy of VERYNEWS. 
This is a two-level namespace hierarchy. The three channels are sub-namespaces of the 
root namespace. 
The resource set RS is defined as follows. 
},,,,,{ UserRoleWorkflowTemplateColumnArticleRS =  
Article represents the published or unpublished articles in VERYNEWS. 
Column represents a group of articles. 
Template represents the layout templates of the display pages of articles and columns. 
Workflow represents a sequence of procedures to process an article. These procedures 
may include creation, verification, publish, and so on. 
Role represents the regular or administrative roles. 
User represents all the users of the RBAC system. 
The operation set O is defined as follows. 










Figure 3 The Namespace Hierarchy of VERYNEWS 
6. Conclusion 
The introduction of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) provides adequate flexibility 
and expansibility for access control. RBAC96 is the classical model of RBAC. 
ARBAC97 facilitates decentralized role administration.  
When applied to a large organization composed of many autonomic branches, there are 
three main shortcomings existing in RBAC96 and ARBAC97.  
SC1. Over-administration 
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We proposed a new model named N-RBAC and introduced the namespace hierarchy to 
fulfill the autonomic requirements in RBAC administration. The N-RBAC model 
subdivides the roles and other resources into multi-level namespaces. The visibility of the 
resources of a namespace is also limited by the namespace. The administrative role 
hierarchy in ARBAC97 is discarded in our model. There is only one fix-authorized 
administrative role in a namespace. The administrative roles of different namespaces 
have no dominance relation, which overcomes SC1. The limited visibility of the 
resources in a namespace arouses the possibility of name reuse in different namespaces. 
By this way, SC2 is settled. 
The N-RBAC model has good expansibility and compatibility. The RBAC96 or 
ARBAC97 models can be implemented without any change in a namespace, which 
facilitates the upgrading from existing RBAC systems to N-RBAC. 
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